

# *RadComm Systems: Prevention of Radioactive Scrap in the Steel Industry.*



**Potential incidents at Steel Plants will increase in the future ...**



[www.radcommsystems.com](http://www.radcommsystems.com)

- *RadComm Systems was incorporated in April 1992 → 25 Year Anniversary*
- *Owner Steve Steranka has over 34 years of experience with radiation detection and has carved out a unique niche by specializing in the metals industry*
- *Privately owned with no other business units (Competitors multi-billion \$ with Radiation only a fraction)*

***Radiation Detection is our ONLY Business***



In the **1970s and 1980s**

*a significant number of  
Sealed Highly Radioactive  
Gauges went into various  
industries.*



**192Ir**



RADIOACTIVE

GAMMAMAT

max. 100 Ci Ir-192

Typ B (U)

ISOTOPE-TECHNIK DR. SAUERWEIN GMBH



D-5657 Haan/Rehm 1

**100 Curies**

241 Am




**137Cs**



**$^{137}\text{Cs}$**  *(Sealed Gauges can be small)*

*For Size comparison purposes. This is a pen*



# An Old Intact Radioactive Gauge with Low Exposure Rate

## SHIELDED RADIOACTIVE SOURCE



EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO DETECT

SIZE - TYPICAL SIZE 25 x 25 x 25 cms

WEIGHS - TYPICALLY 30 Kgs. (75 LBS.)

DESIGNED FOR SAFE PERSONNEL HANDLING

HIGHLY RADIOACTIVE IF SAFETY SHIELD IS MELTED



**!!! VERY HIGH CLEAN UP COSTS !!!**

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**RADCOMM**  
RADIATION DETECTION SYSTEMS




# Short List of Radioactive Gauge Smelting ....

2008	TISCO, Stainless	China	Co-60
2008	Carbon Steel Plant	Germany	Cs-137
2007	Outokumpo	Finland	Am-241
2007	Carbon Steel Plant	China	Co-60
2004	Acciaierie Beltrame	Italy	Cs-137
2004	Sidenor	Cantabria, Spain	Cs-137
2004	Aser	Erandio, Biscay, Spain	Cs-137
2004	Wu Yang Steel	Shan-Xi, China	Cs-137
2004	Capegate	South Africa	Cs-137
2004	Timken	Canton, OH, USA	Cs-137
2004	Stainless Steel	India	Co-60
2004	Ovako	Sweden	Am-241
2004	Outokumpu Stainless	Sheffield, UK	Am-241
2004	NUCOR Steel	Jewett, TX, USA	Cs-137



**+140 sealed radioactive source accidents in the metals industry**



**Meaning:** The Steel Plant was monitoring with large scale radiation detection systems at the time of the accident.

*Detection of these highly radioactive gauges can be a serious problem ....*



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It is a **FACT**...


*that greater than  
90% of the Steel  
Plants were  
monitoring when the  
accident occurred !!!*

# Furnace and Melt shop are Contaminated





# Rolling Mill is Contaminated



# Slag Pit is Contaminated



# Slag Pots are Contaminated



# OffGas Ducting and Baghouse are Contaminated





# Slag Pit Cooling Area is Contaminated







**Slag Processing Area and Equipment are Contaminated**





*The following slides will show  
the primary reasons why  
accidents occurred and will  
ONLY become more frequent  
in the coming years.*



# Radioactivity has a Half Life Issue (example: **After 30 years**)

*The amount of detectable radiation decays over time*

**$^{192}\text{Ir}$**  (73.8 day Half Life) - after 30 years (148.4 Half Life's)

**$^{60}\text{Co}$**  (5.27 years Half Life) - after 30 years (5.7 Half Life's)

**$^{137}\text{Cs}$**  (30.7 years Half Life) - after 30 years (0.98 Half Life's)

**$^{241}\text{Am}$**  (432.2 years Half Life) – after 30 years (0.07 Half Life's)

OLD radioactive gauges still in their original manufactured safety shield emit less radiation levels than the day they were manufactured making them **EXTREMELY** hard to detect.

# Most Radioactive Elements have **Gamma Rays** ...

*The Lower the Gamma KeV Energy level the more difficult it is to detect*

**$^{192}\text{Ir}$**  (317/468 KeV Primary) - 100% blocked by 1.7" (43mm) of steel 

**$^{60}\text{Co}$**  (1187/1332 KeV Primary) – 100% blocked by 12" (305mm) of Steel


**$^{137}\text{Cs}$**  (662 KeV Primary) – 100% blocked by 6" (152mm) of steel

**$^{241}\text{Am}$**  (59.9 KeV Primary) – 100% blocked by 0.6" (15mm) of steel

**Gamma Energies from a heavily buried, Intact, old radioactive gauge can be totally BLOCKED.**

# Heavily Shielded and Buried Radioactive Sources

*It is possible to completely stop all radiation emissions*



There is little that can be done to detect this radioactive source when it is heavily buried in this location of the vehicle.

# Radioactivity Dissipates in Air

*The amount of detectable radiation decreases as distance increases*

**Inverse Square Law Applies....  $I \sim 1/r^2$**

**Radioactive source**



S

**Easy to Detect**



r

**Harder to Detect**




2r

**Extremely Difficult to Detect**



3r



# Measured Ambient Background Radiation Levels are Severely Affected by the Vehicle Entering and Exiting the Scanning Area


## Entering




## Vehicle In



## Exiting



# Depression of Measured Background Radiation Caused by the Vehicle and Scrap Metal




Depression in Measured Ambient Background Radiation Levels as the Vehicle Passes can be up to 70%.

Graph shows a Vehicle Clean Scan with no Radiation



# Depression and Increase in Measured Background Radiation Caused by the Vehicle and Scrap Metal



Depression in Measured Ambient Background Radiation Levels with an increase caused by a density change.

Graph shows a Vehicle Clean Scan with no Radiation

# *Changes in Vehicle and Scrap Densities Cause Severe Changes in the Measured Ambient Background Levels*


**Heavy Density**

**Light Density**

**Heavy Density**



# *Changes in Vehicle and Scrap Densities Cause Severe Changes in the Measured Ambient Background Levels*




Heavy Density

Lighter Density

Heavy Density

# Scanning (Dwell) Time for a Radioactive Source is Critical...



The most practical travel speeds for scanning a radioactive source in a moving vehicle is between 5 to 8 Km/h



## Detector Widths

Wider detector panels provide increased “Dwell Time”. Dwell Time allows increased sampling time for more accurate alarm threshold level settings.

## *Narrow Detectors and Increased Vehicle Speed*

*--- Decrease detection capability*

# *Narrower the Detector Panel the Slower the Speed*



<5 Km/h



<10 Km/h



<15Km/h


# Reliable Detection of a Radioactive Source Depends On...

*Detector Size, Location, Strength of Radiation and Shielding*

***Small physical size and shielded radioactive source***



**Small Sized Detectors**



Moving the detector to this location closer to the source would have resulted in a detection




# ***Detectors Panels must be Situated as close as Possible to the material that will be scanned...***



**They are too far apart, too small and improperly placed.**

**Significant loss in detection capability.**




# Most Reliable Detection of a Radioactive Source... *Proper Detector Area Coverage and Placement*

An upper detector can be installed but extreme caution should be taken for high vehicles

A detector in the ground below the vehicle usually results in water damage and very limited detection capability

Not Recommended



Detectors should be located within 1 meter (39") of the vehicle surface area which is the best working solution for Truck and Railcar applications



**The BEST Detector Panel Placement is to have the entire surface of the vehicle/material being scanned in Direct View of the detector Panel...**




***Detectors Panels must be Situated as close as Possible to the material that will be scanned...***




# Old Aging PVT Scintillation Material

+8 year old detection systems aging becomes very noticeable



Aged - PVT - New

- Aging, yellowing PVT scintillators  
*“ St. Gobain estimates the performance degradation of plastic scintillators (PVT) to be in the order of 3% per year...”*
- Up to 10% degradation per year for energies below 100KeV



**Aging = Yellowing**


# **These are the primary reasons Radioactive Sources have gone undetected by CONVENTIONAL radiation detection systems resulting in multi-million Plant Contaminations.**

- 1. Half Life of Radioactivity.**
- 2. Gamma Energies and Shielding.**
- 3. The Inverse-Square-Law (fall off in intensity with distance).**
- 4. Severe changes caused by the vehicle entering and exiting.**
- 5. Severe changes caused by varying vehicle and scrap densities.**
- 6. Vehicle Speed.**
- 7. Proper Detector Size and Placement.**
- 8. Old Aging Detection Medium.**


*RadComm's Advanced  
Technology for detecting Heavily  
Shielded Old Radioactive Gauges  
in Scrap Metal*

*RadComm has 25 years of experience with  
more 5,000 system installations with a  
proven safety record.*


# RadComm Systems Utilizes a Specially Designed Histogram of Isotopic Energy Distribution .....




RadComm Processed Histogram of Gamma Energy



# Region of Interest (R.O.I.) Energy Distribution of $^{241}\text{Am}$ ...




# Region of Interest (R.O.I.) Energy Distribution of $^{137}\text{Cs}$ ...







# Region of Interest (R.O.I.) Energy Distribution of $^{60}\text{Co}$ ...



# N.O.R.M. Region of Interest (R.O.I.) Energy Distribution of <sup>40</sup>K...



# RadComm Systems Multiple Region-of-Interest (R.O.I.) Alarm Threshold Analyses for Specific Energies .....



*Significant increase in detection capability*


*Energy Regions*

## Potential for Missing a Radioactive Source

**A Radioactive Source located in the area where the scrap density is increasing is extremely difficult to detect...**

— Normal Background level with radioactive source  
— Normal Background level

Radiation Peak Level




# RadComm Systems Real-time Tracking of Energy Distribution Provides Critical Density Information...



## Detector #1 Density Distribution


	Det. 1	Det. 2
Highest	5570	6515
Lowest	3390	4040



## Detector #2 Density Distribution

[www.radcommsystems.com](http://www.radcommsystems.com)


Scan 4 (In)  
October 19, 2010, 01:38:34



Density distribution for Detector 1 PMT 2


RadComm Controller | Model : | Serial :  
SW Version 2.0 Build3573

Scan 4 (In)  
October 19, 2010, 01:38:34



Density distribution for Detector 2 PMT 2

# SNR Energy Specific Density Compensating Real-Time Alarm Analyses cont...



# SNR Energy Specific Density Compensating Real-Time Alarm Analyses cont...



Peak caused by a radioactive source and was easily detected in Region 1-8 with the SNR Alarm Thresholds

***Bury a heavily shielded OLD radioactive gauge in scrap being carried in a fast moving vehicle.....***



***It becomes extremely hard to detect if not impossible !!!***







# Example of Rejected Container caught in Rotterdam





*RadComm at the end of 2016 has seen a 22% YOY increase in the number of calls from customers and non customers who have had containers of scrap material refused or seized for radioactive sources/contamination*



# *What does this mean to SE Asian Steel Companies?*

*Steel manufacturers in North American, Europe, Japan, and South Korea all invest heavily in protecting their facilities from potentially contaminated scrap.*

*Scrap companies look for countries to “dump” potentially “hot” scrap*

***No Detectors = Opportunity to still sell “hot” scrap***



**RADCOMM**  
RADIATION DETECTION SYSTEMS

The RADCOMM difference...

- *Innovative products*
- *Reliable, responsive service*
- *Dedicated personnel*

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